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Abstract This paper examines a stochastic model to determine optimal pricing,
waiting time, output, and sizing decisions for service firms which compete on time
in an uncertain environment. Sizing decisions concern optimal service capacity and
maximum physical waiting room (with a given probability). Customers are sensitive
to money price and expected waiting time. The firm, modeled as an M/M/1 queue, is
assumed to be a full price taker as a result of the stochastic version of the perfect
competition assumption. Firm costs function includes fixed and variable costs. We
initially fix the service rate and obtain a closed-form expression for the waiting time,
price, output and waiting room which lead to maximize the net revenue. Subse-
quently, we obtain first-order conditions for the profit maximizing service capacity.
We find that an optimal capacity may exist when service capacity costs are strictly
convex. When capacity costs are linear or concave, an optimal capacity does not
exist, and it is possible to obtain higher expected profits by increasing service
capacity, as the time competition principle states. However, in the linear case we
find a failure of that principle, which is, there is a limit in speeding up processes.
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In service firms and in make-to-order production firms, waiting time plays a
significant role in customers’ buying decisions. Customers are required to spend a
significant amount of time obtaining the service or product. It was at the end of the
1980s when this aspect was used as a competitive weapon and firms started to
compete on delivery time to increase their market shares. Time-based competition
emerged as a new competitive weapon that led firms to outstanding success (Stalk
1988; Stalk and Hout 1990; Blackburn 1991; Png and Reitman 1994).
This concern for competition against time attracted special attention in the
literature in the 1990s, see, for example Kalai et al. (1992), Loch (1994a, b), Li and
Lee (1994), Daniel (1995), Lederer and Li (1997), and Parra-Frutos and Aranda
(1999b).
The advantage of using queuing theory to describe service firms lies in the fact
that waiting time becomes an endogenous variable, a decision variable of the model.
We focus on service firms because their characteristics (direct sales, non-storability,
non-transportability, service creation while it is being supplied, etc.) are better
represented by a queuing system.
We propose a model, based on an M/M/1 queue, for firms which compete on
delivery times and develop their activity in perfect competition. The study is made
in terms of expected values for those variables considered random, i.e., in the long
run. The aim of the model is to find optimal levels for the decision variables such as
service capacity, mean waiting time, money price, expected output rate, and waiting
room size (or accumulated orders with a given probability).
The basic idea of the model is that we assume there are some flows, such as those
given by demand and service rates, which are clearly related between each other and
other variables, for instance, money price, consumer budget, etc. Setting up a
business then should be performed so that the resulting adjustment of these flows
returns the maximum expected profits. Our model internalizes the corresponding
relationships (or internal forces) and the proposed solution describes the final
(expected) state of flows and their consequences for money price, waiting time, and
waiting room size.
This model belongs to those known as congestion models, which are based in the
main on queuing theory. They are concerned with optimizing systems where
individuals (or elements, in general) suffer or may suffer a delay. In addition, they
are characterized by the existence of endogenous externalities among customers,
that is, an individual who joins the system causes a negative effect (congestion) on
the rest of consumers (Loch 1994a).
It is also a time competition model, where customers are sensitive to waiting time,
and hence endogenous externalities among customers are also present. Loch (1994a)
affirms that time competition models represent a class of firm differentiation models,
as an alternative to location models, where customer externalities are exogenous,
i.e., constant and given, and therefore the firm differentiation is exogenous.
Differences between this model and those studied in the literature on time
competition arise mainly from the control variables, the type of market and the
market mechanism. The monopoly market is considered by So and Song (1997) and
460 SERIEs (2010) 1:459–474
123
Parra-Frutos and Aranda (1999b). The latter considers the possibility of reducing
money price when experiencing long waiting times. Duopoly markets are
investigated in Kalai et al. (1992), Li and Lee (1994), and Loch (1994a, b). The
first studies a queuing system with two servers and only one queue when money
price and demand level are given. Li and Lee develop a particular queuing system
with two servers and two queues with jockeying. Loch (1994a) uses an M/G/1 queue
to describe firms, the consumers are homogeneous, service capacity is given and
does not consider costs, and thus, expected incomes are maximized. Loch (1994b)
extends the previous model to several customer groups with different levels of
impatience, but models firms through an M/M/1 queue. Loch’s models consider
delivery times endogenous, but they focus on price competition and quantity
competition. Oligopolistic markets are examined by Davidson (1982, 1988) and
Daniel (1995). Davidson focuses on price advertisement to consider complete and
incomplete price information markets. He uses an M/M/1/B queuing model with
truncated arrival rate. Demand and service capacity are given. Daniel does not
consider firms costs, and the expected service rate is not a control variable for the
firms, which are described using an M/M/1 queue where service capacities are
identical and given. Perfect competition is considered in Lederer and Li (1997).
This model describes firms as an M/G/1 queue which can choose scheduling
policies to specify how incoming jobs are sequenced. Firms do not offer
homogeneous goods and services and customers are not homogeneous. The model
does not consider budget restrictions and fixed costs.
One contribution of our model lies in its optimizing all the firms’ decision
variables under uncertainty and congestion. There is no variable which firms must
fix in advance. In other models, for instance, capacity level or demand is given.
Here firms optimize their behavior using consumer knowledge. As Stalk and
Webber (1993) state, to be a successful time competitor it is not sufficient to speed
up processes but it is also necessary to link consumer knowledge to time-based
capabilities. We propose an expected profit function similar to that studied in Daniel
(1995), although he neither considers capacity costs nor optimizes service quality
nor focuses on an oligopolistic setting.
There are other related studies based on queuing theory, but with a different
emphasis. However, none studies time competition. Their interest lies in efficient
pricing in a perfect competition environment under uncertainty and congestion.
Among them, we can mention, for instance, De Vany and Saving (1977, 1980,
1983) and De Vany et al. (1983). De Vany and Saving (1977) uses the truck
transport industry to consider situations where one market dominates the other (two
different geographical points). De Vany and Saving (1980) model the competitive
supply and pricing of highways with random traffic. The highway system is viewed
as a self-service queuing model and the queues that develop at the highway entrance
are ignored. De Vany and Saving (1983) use a G/G/1 queue to describe firms with a
convex function for costs. De Vany et al. (1983) describe firms as G/G/1 and study
some qualitative characteristics of equilibrium without considering the impact of
different types of cost functions. They do not take into account the impact of waiting
time and service capacity on demand. The reader is referred to Parra-Frutos (1997)
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and Parra-Frutos and Aranda (1999a) for a review of this kind of queuing model
under different market structures (monopoly, duopoly and perfect competition).
Our concern is to study not only the profit-maximizing firm behavior but also the
consumer behavior in a perfect competition environment. In addition, we also focus
on a relatively new aspect in competition—time-based competition. In time
competition waiting time, as well as price, is a control variable.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the model
assumptions. In Sect. 3 we investigate a particular profit function to obtain optimal
solutions for firms’ dimensions. Finally, in Sect. 4 we give some concluding
remarks and propose some extensions of the model.
2 The model
2.1 Consumer behavior
The firm offers a service, with money price given by p [ 0, which can be obtained
after waiting a certain time. Since waiting is a fundamental part of a service,
customers are not only interested in the money price, but also in the full price. The
full price refers to the sum of the money price and waiting time cost.
We consider there is a large number of customers who act independently of each
other and base their decisions on their experience and a firm’s reputation or
publicity rather than on ad hoc search. Customers will take into account expected
waiting time (W) instead of actual waiting time. Consequently, it is the expected full
price that summarizes all the relevant information for customers. Hence, we are
assuming consumers who are sensitive to price and time.
The buying decision rule consists of ordering the service if the expected full price
is not higher than the reservation full price (R), which is the highest expected full
price consumers are willing to pay
p þ cW R; ð1Þ
where c is the marginal time value of a consumer. We assume that customers
are homogenous, so they have the same reservation full price and the same time
value.
Customers will only accept the set of combinations of money price and expected
waiting time that verifies (1). Put differently, given a money price (expected waiting
time) customers will accept an interval of values for the expected waiting time
(money price), so that the expected full price is not higher than the reservation full
price.
Given a money price and a service capacity, in terms of the expected number of
individuals who can be served per time unit, the expected waiting time in a firm is
then determined by customers, through the arrival rate. As long as (1) is not verified
for equality, consumers have an incentive to place an order with this firm. So, the
arrival rate increases until the expected waiting time makes the reservation full price
constraint be verified for equality.
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There is a tradeoff between money price and waiting time. Customers are willing
to wait longer if the money price reduces. So, in order to wait less they accept a
higher money price.
2.2 The demand
Customers are assumed to be price and time sensitive. So, the expected arrival
rate, k, depends on the firm’s money price and the expected waiting time. So, we
have
k ¼ k p; WðlÞð Þ ð2Þ
where l is the firm’s service capacity.
In order to simplify the analysis, we will focus on a particular firm, so we do not
need to identify firms with an index. The reader should bear in mind that the
analysis is identical for every firm but it does not necessarily imply the same
optimal result for the money price, waiting time, and service capacity.
We also assume that customers demand a single service upon their arrival at the
firm, and they arrive individually, according to a Poisson process with parameter k.
2.3 The firm
We assume that the firm’s service rate also follows a Poisson process with expected
value given by l. This parameter is also known as the service capacity since it refers
to the number of customers who may be served per time unit, on average. The
service time therefore follows an exponential distribution with expected value 1/l.
We assume that firms fix their service capacity according to market character-
istics and their expected profit function. Once customer properties are known and
capacity is fixed, firms set their money price so that it leads to an optimum mean
waiting time, that is, a profit-maximizing one. Thus, a firm that competes on time
uses its decision variables, capacity and money price, to induce a certain mean
waiting time.
Firms can be modeled under all these assumptions using an M/M/1 queuing
system, whose steady-state solution is (see Gross and Harris 1998)





where Pk is the probability of k individuals in the firm waiting or being served.
There are different ways of interpreting the parameter q (known as the traffic
intensity). It can be understood as the capacity utilization rate; as the probability
of being busy; and finally, as the fraction of each time interval where the firm
is busy.
The expected waiting time (queuing time plus service time) is given by (see
Gross and Harris 1998)
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W k; lð Þ ¼ 1
l k: ð5Þ
Note that an increase in the service capacity, ceteris paribus, gives rise to a
reduction in the expected waiting time. However, an increase in the arrival rate
results in the opposite effect, an increase in system congestion.
We consider that the firm would like at most n individuals in the waiting room,
but it is willing to accept more than n with probability equal to or lower than a,
where a is very small.
Let N be the random variable ‘‘number of individuals in the firm waiting or being
served’’. The firm will establish a waiting room of n individuals so that it verifies
Pr N [ n½   a: ð6Þ
Lemma 1 Given k, l, and a, the maximum number of individuals (orders) waiting,
n, with probability at least 1 - a is
n ln a
ln k ln l 1: ð7Þ
Proof Using (3) and (6) we obtain
Pr N [ n½  ¼
X1
i¼nþ1
qi 1  qð Þ ¼ qnþ1  a: ð8Þ
Finally, substituting (4) we can derive (7). h
2.4 The output
It can be shown (see Gross and Harris, 1998, pp. 167–170) that when we are dealing
with a queuing system like M/M/c/? then the output probability distribution is the
same as the input distribution and is not affected at all by the exponential service
mechanism. So, if the arrival rate distribution is Poisson with parameter k then the
output also follows a Poisson distribution with identical expected value.
2.5 The Poisson-exponential probability distribution
In the following sections, and in queuing theory in general, the Poisson-exponential
distribution plays a key role. There are arguments in favor of it which try to show
that it is not a restrictive assumption. One strong argument in favor of exponential
inputs is that the limit of a binomial distribution with small probability of success
(e.g. entering the system) and defined over a large set of elements or individuals
(population) is Poisson. In the second place, one characteristic of a Poisson process
is that the moments of time when events occur are uniformly distributed over
time (see Ross 1989, p. 224; Law and Kelton 1991, p. 393). Thus, the Poisson-
exponential distribution implies that any moment of time is equally likely to have an
arrival. Third, there is an additional argument from information theory which says
that the exponential distribution provides the least information and is, therefore, the
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most random law which can be used and, thus, provides a reasonably conservative
approach. The Poisson-exponential distribution therefore represents the most
random specification of the stochastic nature of demand and service processes.
Relaxing this assumption leads to more deterministic processes (Daniel 1995).
2.6 The stochastic version of the perfect competition assumption
Perfect competition is a market structure mainly characterized by two assumptions:
the existence of a high number of firms and consumers and the homogeneity of the
product. These assumptions together imply that firms are price-taker or atomistic,
i.e., firms cannot influence market prices and have to accept them as given.
The stochastic version of the perfect competition assumption would be the
following: firms are takers of the expected full price such that they can sell any level
of output at the expected full price of the market. That is, they can receive any
expected number of arrivals of customers simply by offering the appropriate level of
capacity.
The fact that firms are expected-full-price takers does not imply they are also
money-price takers. Indeed, a firm may have any set of money prices, but has to
accept the resulting impact on its demand, since the expected waiting time adjusts
till the expected full price equals the expected full price of the market.
As customers are indifferent to firms where they place an order in perfect
competition, all the firms will offer the same expected full price in equilibrium. This
does not imply having the same combination of money price and expected waiting
time.
If a firm takes any action which, given its money price, modifies the expected
waiting time and makes its expected full price lower than that of the market, then
customers will have an incentive to demand this service and therefore will increase
their arrival rate until this incentive disappears, i.e., until the expected waiting time
is re-established at the previous level—that of other firms (the expected full price of
the market). A similar inverse process will start if a firm has an expected full price
above that fixed by the market. The consumer behavior will lead to a market
expected full price given by R.
Other perfect competition models using queuing theory have considered that
the market expected full price is determined somehow by the market (e.g. De Vany
and Saving 1980) or as a result of an optimal customer behavior consisting of
minimizing expected service costs (Davidson 1988), or as a result of maximizing
firm profits (Lederer and Li 1997). These studies did not consider the possibility that
the resulting market full price exceeds customer budget restrictions.
3 The expected profit function
We assume a large number of consumers and firms offering a homogeneous service.
Firms are greatly influenced by customer characteristics, so these characteristics, in
particular, budget constraint and marginal time value, should be taken into account
if firms want to optimize their profits.
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If we assume that parameters c and R are known by the firm then, given an expected
waiting time W, the firm will set that money price which verifies expression (1) on
equality. Consequently, to determine the optimum money price, we need to obtain
the optimum expected waiting time which leads to a profit-maximizing arrival rate.
We assume that firm costs depend on service capacity and demand. A particular
level of service capacity implies a given capability to serve customers, the cost of
which has to be paid independently of its level of use. This cost is denoted by C(l),
where CðlÞ 6¼ 0 if l 6¼ 0 and dCðlÞ=dl ¼ C0ðlÞ[ 0: In addition, we assume that it
is a continuous and derivable function, with the first and second derivatives
continuous. On the other hand, there are some variable costs, denoted by c, that
depend on the level of demand, and these are applicable to each service. Thus, c is a
fixed cost per customer.
The demand function (expected arrival rate) is obtained from (5) and the money
price function from the reservation expected full price constraint. Hence






p Wð Þ ¼ R  cW where W\R
c
: ð10Þ
Conditions for W are derived when imposing k[ 0 and p [ 0. The total expected
net income is given by the following function
I W ; lð Þ ¼ k W ; lð Þ pðWÞ  c½ : ð11Þ
Hence, the expected profit function for a firm is




R  cW  cð Þ  C lð Þ; ð12Þ
where 1=l\W\R=c: In this formulation it can be observed that W and l are the
decision variables. Consequently, the firm has to install a service capacity level and
set the money price that induces the waiting time desired. The remaining variables,
output and waiting room size, will adjust according to the market mechanism
summarized in (9) and (7).
Before studying the characteristics of the expected profit function (which we
group in Lemma 2) we investigate the conditions on l and W such that P(W, l) is
positive. If it is null or negative, then the firm will decide not to set up in that
market, or will leave if it is already operating in it. Therefore, the maximization
problem would not make sense.







This condition gives the values of W that make the total expected net income
positive. This happens when the arrival rate k(W, l) and the net income per customer
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p(W) - c are, in turn, positive. The first inequality is derived using (9). Note that if
the maximum mean waiting time accepted by individuals is equal or inferior to the
mean service time of the firm (1/l), the firm will have no demand and, hence, a loss
equal to the capacity cost. Second, to have a positive net income per customer, it
must also occur that p(W) [ c, and using (10) we obtain W \ (R - c)/c.
This condition is implicitly including a restriction on p given by
c\p\R: ð14Þ
The first part of this inequality has been used to obtain (13). It can be derived that
p is lower than R by using in (10) the upper bound for W given in (13).
Condition B The following condition on service capacity can be derived from
(13), since 1=l\ðR  cÞ=c must occur,
l[
c
R  c: ð15Þ
This condition gives the possible range of values for service capacity according
to consumer characteristics. Note that if condition A verifies, then condition B
verifies as well, but not vice versa. For the sake of simplicity we denote the
minimum service capacity level c=ðR  cÞ as l*.
Condition C The capacity cost function is such that the expected profit function is
positive for some W and l.
Therefore, the firm’s expected profit function may be finally written as




R  cW  cð Þ  C lð Þ if W 2 1l; Rcc
 
and l [ l
C lð Þ rest
(
ð16Þ
where conditions A and B have been included. Finally, we impose that condition C
must also be verified. Before studying optimal solutions for the problem of
maximizing profits we investigate the properties of this function in the following
lemma.
Lemma 2 The expected profit function P(W, l) has the following properties:
(i) For any fixed value l = l0, P(W; l0) is a continuous function in W[0, whose
first and second derivatives are continuous in W 2 1=l0; ðR  cÞ=cð Þ:
(ii) For any fixed value l = l0, P(W; l0) is a strictly concave function with
respect to W, VW [ 0.
(iii) There exist two values W1 and W2, where 1=l\W1\W2\ðR  cÞ=c; such
that P(W, l) [ 0 if W [ (W1, W2).
(iv) There exists a maximum in P(W, l) when W [ (1/l, (R - c)/c).
(v) For any fixed value W = W0, such that 0 \ W0 \ (R - c)/c, P(l; W0) is a
continuous function of l, where l[l*.
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(vi) For any fixed value W = W0, such that 0 \ W0 \ (R - c)/c, P(l; W0) is a
convex (concave) function with respect to l if C(l) is concave (convex). If a
minimum (maximum) exists, then it verifies p  c ¼ C0ðlÞ. In addition, it is
monotonic increasing for those values of l such that p  c[ C0ðlÞ, and
monotonic decreasing when the contrary is the case.
Proof To prove property (i) note that possible discontinuities may be at W = 1/l0
and W = (R - c)/c. However,
lim
W!1=l0
P W ; l0ð Þ ¼ lim
W!1=lþ0
P W ; l0ð Þ ¼ P 1=l0; l0
  ¼ C l0ð Þ; ð17Þ
lim
W!ðRcÞ=c
P W ; l0ð Þ ¼ lim
W!ðRcÞ=cþ
P W ; l0ð Þ ¼ P ðR  cÞ=c; l0ð Þ ¼ C l0ð Þ;
ð18Þ
Hence, P(W; l0) is continuous in W [ 0. Its first and second derivatives are
oP W ;l0ð Þ
oW
¼ R  c
W2
 cl0; ð19Þ
o2P W ; l0ð Þ
oW2
¼ 2 R  cð Þ
W3
: ð20Þ
It can be easily shown that both functions are continuous in 1/l0 \ W \ (R - c)/
c. Property (ii) is easily shown since (20) is negative, given that it verifies
expression (14) and W [ 0.
To show property (iii) we have, using (16), that P(W, l) \ 0 at W = 1/l and
W = (R - c)/c. Taking into account conditions A and C, we can affirm that there
exists an open interval ðW1; W2Þ  ð1=l; ðR  cÞ=cÞ where P(W, l) is positive. In
addition, from Bolzano’s theorem, PðW1; lÞ ¼ PðW2; lÞ ¼ 0:
Property (iv) derives from (i), (ii), and (iii). From property (i) P(W, l) is contin-
uous; from property (ii) it is strictly concave; and finally from property (iii)
P(W, l) \ 0 at W = 1/l and W = (R - c)/c, and P(W, l) [ 0 at
ðW1; W2Þ  ð1=l; ðR  cÞ=cÞ. Therefore, P(W, l) has a maximum at W^ 2 W1; W2ð Þ
such that oP=oW W¼W^
 ¼ 0:
To prove property (v) we should take into account the assumption of continuity of
C(l).
Property (vi) is derived by calculating the corresponding derivatives of P(l; W0)
with respect to l oP l; W0ð Þ
ol
¼ R  cW0  c C0 lð Þ; ð21Þ
o2P l; W0ð Þ
ol2
¼ C00 lð Þ ð22Þ
h
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3.1 Optimal solution for firms already installed in the market
The optimal solution derived from maximizing expected profits with respect to W
when the service capacity is already installed is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Let a service firm be a time competitor in a market in perfect
competition modeled by a queuing system M/M/1 whose demand is composed of one
class of customer with a reservation full price R and marginal time cost c. Then, to
have a profit-maximizing waiting time given a service capacity installed lI, such
that lI [l*, a firm should fix the money price.
p^ ¼ R 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ











The optimum expected output rate is then






where k^ is strictly increasing in lI. Finally, the optimum waiting room size with
probability of at least 1 - a is
n^ ln a
ln k^ ln lI
 1 0\a\1: ð26Þ
Proof From property (iv) of Lemma 2 the expected profit function (16) presents a
maximum in the interval ð1=l; ðR  cÞ=cÞ. The first-order condition to maximize
(16) allows us to derive an expression for the optimum mean waiting time for a







Using (10), the appropriate money price is
p^ ¼ R  cW^ :
From (9) and (27) the expected output rate is given by



























From here, it can be derived that k^ is convex and has a minimum at ~l ¼ c=½4ðR  cÞ,
where ~l\l. Therefore, k^ is strictly increasing with respect to l, Vl[l*, such that
the stochastic version of the perfect competition assumption is verified.
Finally, using Lemma 1, for a small a (where 0 \ a\ 1) fixed by the firm, the
optimum waiting room size is
n^ ln a
ln k^ ln lI
 1:
h
In this section we assume that the firm is already installed in the market with an
appropriate service capacity level. The firm decides to compete on time and then fix
a money price that leads to a profit-maximizing waiting time. The resulting output
(the expected number of individuals the firm should serve per unit time) and waiting
room size (if physical presence is required, otherwise this is equivalent to the
maximum number of accumulated orders with probability at least 1 - a) are given
in (25) and (26), respectively.
3.2 Optimal dimension of service firms
If the service firm is not already installed or it is possible to adjust its service
capacity, then it should fix an optimum level. In this section we investigate the
expected profit at the optimum mean waiting time as a function of service capacity,
that is, the optimal expected profit function (OEPF), which is denoted by P* (l). We
use this function to derive those values of the service capacity which give the
highest level of optimal expected profit.
Substituting (24) for Vl in (16) we obtain the OEPF P*(l)
P lð Þ ¼ P l; W^  ¼ R  cð Þl 2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
c R  cð Þ
p ﬃﬃﬃ
l
p þ c  C lð Þ; ð28Þ
where l[ l*.
Observe that PðlÞ ¼ CðlÞ\0. Note also that P*(l) is different from P(l;
W0) studied in property (vi) of Lemma 2. The second function is defined for a fixed
value W = W0, and the first one allows W to vary.
The first-order condition to maximize (28) leads to
C0 l^ð Þ þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
c R  cð Þ
p
l^1=2 ¼ R  c; ð29Þ
where l^ may not exist, depending on C(l). Moreover, if l^ exists, an explicit
expression may not be always found. The second-order condition is







c R  cð Þ
p
l3=2  C00 lð Þ: ð30Þ
The results of the study ofl^, if it exists, are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 If l^ exists, then l^ [ l.
Proof Since C0 lð Þ[ 0, using (29) we have
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ






R  c ¼ l
:
h
This lemma affirms that if l^ exists and optimizes P*(l) when l [ R?, then it
also belongs to the domain of P*(l) given by l[l*. Using (30), P*(l) may be
concave or convex depending on the functional form of capacity cost C(l).
Consequently, l^; if it exists, will be a maximum or a minimum.
We now investigate the consequences, for the OEPF and service capacity
decision, of different functional forms for the capacity cost. In particular, we discuss
a linear, concave and convex capacity cost function, that is, when C00ðlÞ ¼ 0;
C00ðlÞ ¼ k1\0 (with k1 constant), and C00ðlÞ ¼ k2 [ 0 (with k2 constant),
respectively.
Lemma 4 P*(l) is convex if C(l) is linear or concave, and it may present a
minimum in l^; if l^ exists (where P*(l^)\0), or be strictly increasing if it does not
exist.
Proof If C(l) is linear, then C00ðlÞ = 0. Thus, the second-order condition (30) is
positive, indicating that P*(l) is convex. If C(l) is concave then C00ðlÞ\0; hence
the second-order condition (30) is also positive and, consequently, P*(l) is again
convex. Finally, if l^ exists, then Pðl^Þ\0; since P*(l*) \ 0 and l^ is a minimum.
If l^ does not exist then P*(l) is strictly increasing since P*(l*) \ 0 and there is
some l such that P*(l) [ 0 (from condition D). h
Consequently, if C(l) is linear or concave, the optimal dimension of a service
firm is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 2 If C(l) is linear or concave, then there exists a capacity level l**,
such that l**[l* and P*(l**) = 0, from which optimal expected profits are
positive and increasing in l.
Proof Recall that P*(l*) \ 0 and, from Condition C, expected profits are positive
for some l. If C(l) is linear or concave, then P*(l) is convex from Lemma 4. It
follows that there exists a capacity level l** such that P*(l**) = 0, and
P*(l) [ 0 Vl[ l**. Thus, the higher the service capacity level, the higher the
optimal expected profits. h
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Consequently, if C(l) is linear or concave, then there is no optimal dimension of
firms, i.e., a dimension which gives rise to the maximum level possible in the
expected profit function. It is always possible to obtain a higher level of expected
profits merely by increasing service capacity.
Bear in mind that an increase in service capacity, ceteris paribus, results in a
lower expected waiting time. So, when C(l) is linear or concave, if a firm engages
in time competition it may speed up its processes, thus increasing its service
capacity. Consequently, it will enlarge its expected profits.





c R  cð Þ
p
l3=2: ð31Þ
In addition, a minimum (maximum) may exist in the convex (concave) span.
Proof C(l) is convex then C00ðlÞ ¼ k2 [ 0: On the other hand,
1=2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
cðR  cÞp l3=2 is positive and strictly decreasing in l. Thus, the second-order
derivative (30) may be positive, for small l, and hence P*(l) could firstly be
convex and later become concave as l increases. h
As a summary of summarize the previous results, and taking into account that
P*(l*) \ 0 we give the following corollary.
Corollary 1 If C(l) is convex then the supreme value of P*(l) is located in its
concave span.
We have not considered a limit on a firm’s demand. This may be valid, for
example, in markets in continuous expansion. However, it may also be thought that
such a limit exists and is given by the total expected market demand (per time unit),
which coincides with the sum of each firm’s demand. On the other hand, this limit
may be considered variable and dependent, for instance, on time (due to increases or
decreases in population), marketing expenses, supply level (due to the fact that a
higher supply gives rise to a higher or lower demand), etc. Note that the analysis
performed is long term since we are working with expected values.
The existence of such a limit for demand would imply that k^ is not strictly
increasing Vl[l*, as we obtained in Theorem 1, but monotonic non-decreasing.
In other words, demand function is constant from a service capacity level, say K, for
which total market demand is achieved. To fix a capacity level above this level
gives rise to a reduction in waiting time, since demand does not increase. From the
firm’s point of view, it would imply higher capacity costs for the same demand level
and, thus, firm profits decrease.
Consequently, using Theorem 2 and Corollary 1, and the possible existence of a
limit for the service capacity, we may conclude the following:
(a) When C(l) is linear or concave, the optimum capacity level is given by the
highest possible one, K. However, a different issue is that the firm may serve
the whole market with only one server. Therefore, there may exist another
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limit lower than K, which would be determined, for instance, by technology or
by physical limitations of the server. In this way, the optimum firm solution is
to serve at its highest rate possible.
(b) When C(l) is convex then the optimum capacity level may coincide with l^,
which maximizes OEPF. Obviously, this depends on the value of K. That is, if
K\l^ then K is optimum level of l, otherwise the optimum value is l^.
Furthermore, it may occur, as in the previous case, that K is an unattainable
value for a single server, since there exists a technical or physical limit for the
service capacity which prevents a single server from supplying the whole
market and thus being a monopoly.
Note that we found that if C(l) is convex [P*(l) is concave] and we can assume
no limit for capacity level, the firm may have an optimal service capacity level such
that optimal expected profits are maximized. In this case, we can affirm that an
increase in service capacity (and hence a time competition) does not always lead to
higher expected profits. This result contradicts what has generally been asserted as
an ‘‘advantage of time competition’’. In other words, we find that in some cases this
advantage may have a limit.
4 Concluding remarks
The model studied here presents results on firms’ equilibria when competing against
time. We show that the strategy firms must follow differs depending on the
functional form of service capacity cost. When service capacity cost is a linear or
concave function, there is no optimal solution for firms, since the higher the
capacity, the higher the expected profits they can obtain. When capacity cost is
convex there may be a unique optimal solution. Accordingly, in certain cases the
principle of time competition, which affirms that speeding up processes leads to
higher profits, cannot be applied.
It should be pointed out that the optimal solution, in the case that it exists, does
not have to be the same for every firm in the market. It would be the same only if
firms have the same cost structure. Therefore, the market may be characterized by
firms offering different combinations of money price and mean waiting time.
We assumed that marginal time cost is linear. This may be seen as a restrictive
assumption since it implies no psychological cost of waiting (e.g. the first minute of
waiting has the same value of the nth). It is generally accepted that waiting produces
negative feelings in individuals, such as frustration, boredom, anxiety, stress, etc.
Thus, there is a psychological cost associated with waiting which we did not take
into account. Unfortunately, much of the voluminous research to date on queuing
has not considered it. Indeed, it is a field of study in which surprisingly little
research has been conducted.
It is also possible to expand the model to consider different classes of customers,
that is, assuming that customers are heterogeneous and have different budget
constraints and marginal time value. This would allow the study of how the market
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accommodates customers with different time preferences and, therefore, the nature
of equilibrium.
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